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2 Direct versus indirect taxation: trends, 
theory, and economic significance* 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Violeta Vulovic, and 
Yongzheng Liu 
1 INTRODUCTION AND SOME DEFINITIONS 
One of the oldest questions in the theory and practice of taxation is that of 
the appropriate mix of direct and indirect taxes. The choice between direct 
and indirect taxes has contributed to a long animated debate, in political 
and academic circles, regarding the virtues and defects of those two forms 
of taxation. In this chapter we provide an overview of the evolution of 
the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes across countries over the past 
three decades, the theorizing that has gone behind the alleged superiority 
of one form of taxation or the other, the determinants that appear to be 
behind the intensity with which both forms of taxation are used, and the 
economic relevance of the choice of tax structure in terms of economic 
growth, macroeconomic stability, the distribution of income, and the flow 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
To get started it is helpful to have a working definition of direct and 
indirect taxes. Following Atkinson (1977) we will define as direct taxes 
those that may be adjusted to the individual characteristics of the taxpayer 
and as indirect taxes those that are levied on transactions irrespective of 
the circumstances of buyer or seller. Thus, conventional income taxes can 
be classified as direct taxes and the same can said for most taxes on assets 
and wealth as long as there are potential adjustments for the characteris­
tics of owners. For example, property taxes on owner-occupied housing 
may be adjusted for the personal characteristics of owners but that is not 
always the case. Property taxes on commercial buildings, motor vehicles, 
and the like are hardly ever adjusted for personal or household character­
istics and therefore those can be considered indirect taxes. In this category 
of indirect taxes are most taxes on transactions with differentiated rates 
(sales, value-added tax [VAT], excises, customs tariff, etc.). But, as indi­
cated by Atkinson, there are what may called 'transitional' taxes between 
the two categories; in particular, a uniform general sales tax can be easily 
transformed into a general consumption or expenditure tax, which can be 
adapted to personal or household characteristics.' 
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Over the last three decades the average ratio of direct to indirect taxes 
for a sample of 116 countries has been on the increase and these changes 
have been more pronounced for developed countries than for developing 
countries. As we will see in detail in the next section, in the case of devel­
oped countries it has been the numerator of the ratio that has moved the 
most, with the main driver being increases in the relative importance of 
Social Security contributions, while smaller relative increases in corporate 
income taxes have been offset by also smaller relative decreases in personal 
income taxes; this has been accompanied by a relatively flat performance 
of domestic consumption taxes. In the case of developing countries, it 
has been changes in the denominator of the ratio that has had the largest 
impact. Fairly large decreases in the relative importance of customs taxes 
have been only partially offset by increases in the relative importance 
of domestic consumption taxes, while at the same time a small decrease 
in income taxes has been more than offset by an increase in the relative 
importance of Social Security contributions. 
In the economics literature a theoretical debate has accompanied over 
the years the choice between direct and indirect forms of taxation. The 
choice of direct versus indirect taxes is fundamental to the optimal design 
of tax structures since those forms of taxation may affect differently the 
goals of efficiency and equity. While some early contributions strove to 
demonstrate the superiority of direct over indirect taxes under specific 
conditions (Hicks, 1939),2 most of the focus early on in the optimal tax 
literature was on separate forms of taxation (e.g., Ramsey, 1927; Diamond 
and Mirrlees, 1971). A key development in the optimal tax literature from 
the perspective of the optimal tax mix was Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) 
seminal paper. These authors, who for the first time considered the inter­
action of direct and indirect taxes in the attainment of efficiency and equity 
goals, reached a powerful result. The Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem states 
that, in an economy where individuals differ only in their earning abilities, 
government can impose a general income tax, and where the utility func­
tion is separable between labor and all commodities, then in the optimum 
tax design there is no need to employ indirect taxation. This important 
result was followed, as we will see in the overview of the theoretical lit­
erature below, by a significant number of other theoretical contributions 
showing how important aspects of the economy (e.g., the scope of tax 
evasion) and heterogeneity among taxpayers would justify the existence 
side by side of direct and indirect forms of taxation. This is comforting 
since basically all economies employ together broad forms of direct and 
indirect taxation even though we are far from fully understanding what 
the main determinants of the direct to indirect tax mix are (Kenny and 
Winer, 2006). 
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With the coexistence of direct and indirect forms of taxation explained 
in the theoretical optimal tax literature, the big question that has remained 
largely unanswered is that of the economic consequences of different mixes 
of direct and indirect taxes. For example, from the perspective of eco­
nomic growth, in a neoclassical framework, the tax structure, and in par­
ticular the tax mix, has no permanent effects on the growth rate, although 
changes in tax policy can have transitory effects.3 But in the context of 
endogenous growth models even stable tax structures can impact the 
growth rate due to the externality effects on the accumulation of human 
and physical capital. As we review below, an increasing number of studies 
find important effects of the tax mix on the rate of economic growth. 
The choice of the direct-indirect tax mix is also likely to have, as 
we review below, important consequences in other dimensions of the 
economy including macroeconomic stability, disparities in income distri­
bution, and foreign direct investment flows. All those, including economic 
growth, will be revisited in this chapter. There are several other potential 
effects of the choice of tax mix, including the impact on risk taking and 
entrepreneurship or taxpayers' moral and voluntary tax compliance. As 
Atkinson (1977) points out, supposedly taxpayers may show preference 
for indirect taxation on the grounds that it offers them choice and some 
politicians may have similar preferences because indirect taxes may be 
perceived by the public as being less visible.4 None of these other possible 
effects will be explored further in this chapter. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide 
an overview of the international trends in the use of direct versus indirect 
forms of taxation over the last three decades. In Section 3 we review the 
theoretical literature on optimal tax design and the more recent empirical 
literature on the economic consequences of the choice of tax structure. 
In Section 4 we revisit the issue of the determinants of tax structure with 
international panel data from the perspective of the direct to indirect tax 
ratio. In Section 5, using the same international panel data set, we explore 
the effects of the direct to indirect tax mix on economic growth, macro-
economic stability, income distribution, and foreign direct investment 
flows. In Section 6 we conclude. 
2 TRENDS IN DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT FORMS 
OF TAXATION 
In this section we provide as background information an overview of 
the evolution of the average direct to indirect tax ratio over the period 
1972-2005 for a sample of 116 developed and developing countries. Figure 
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2.5 
Note: a. Based on a sample of 116 countries (number of countries in the sample varies 
across years) (note change in GFS methodology after 1990); property taxes included in 
direct taxes; for 1990-94 data not available. 
Source: IMF GFS Database. 
Figure 2.1 A verage annual direct to indirect tax ratio," 1972-2005 
2.1 shows the trend when property taxes are classified as direct taxes, but 
the trends are maintained when property taxes are classified as indirect 
taxes, with tax ratio having a lower value.5 This figure omits observa­
tions for the period 1990-99 because a change of classification in the GFS 
(Government Finance Statistics) from the IMF led to irregular country 
reporting over the period, which distorts the average figures.6 
Several significant trends are observed. For developed countries the 
ratio has steadily increased over the period by over 50 per cent while for 
developing countries has roughly stayed the same, with an average ratio 
that is about one-third of its value for the average of developed countries. 
For both developed and developing countries there tends to be somewhat 
of a jump in the direct to indirect ratio in the 2000s but without a clear 
trend. Some of this increase in the tax ratio is no doubt due to the changes 
in the definition of GFS, which most substantially represented a more 
explicit separate accounting for Social Security taxes, which before 1990 
had been classified as non-tax revenues and also partially as income taxes. 
For the full sample, there is correspondingly also an increase of the tax 
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Note: a. Based on a sample of 116 countries (number of countries in the sample varies 
across years) (note change in GFS methodology after 1990); property taxes included in 
direct taxes; for 1990-99 data not available. 
Source: IMF GFS Database. 
Figure 2.2 Average annual tax structure as a share of total taxes," 
1972-2005 
ratio from roughly a value of 0.75 during the 1970s and 1980s to almost 
1.0 in the most recent years. 
To understand better what is driving the behavior of the direct to indi­
rect tax ratio, we show the historical evolutions of the share of each of the 
main taxes as a ratio of total taxes over the 1972-2005 period for the full 
sample, and for developed, developing, and transition countries in Figures 
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, respectively. We should note that GFS reporting 
is fairly aggregate in some cases and so, for example, we are not able to 
distinguish, for a number of countries, between personal and corporate 
income taxes or in the case of domestic consumption taxes, between VAT 
and excises. Although one should not pay much attention to fluctuations 
over short periods of time, which can be due to, among other things, 
sample composition, these figures are useful to identify some trends. In 
terms of indirect taxes, for the full sample we observe an increase in con­
sumption taxes, supposedly driven by increases in VAT collections. This 
increase in the relative importance of consumption taxes is apparent in the 
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Note: a. Based on a sample of 32 developed countries (number of countries in the sample 
varies across years) (note change in GFS methodology after 1990); for 1990-99 data not 
available. 
Sources: IMF GFS Database and World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Figure 2.3 Average annual tax structure as a share of total taxes in 
developed countries," 1972-2005 
groups of developing and transition countries; for the case of developed 
countries their importance remains fairly flat. 
Another noticeable trend is the drop in the relative importance of 
customs taxes, especially in developing countries. For many decades now 
a standard policy recommendation for developing countries, from the 
IMF, the World Bank, and many other sources, has been to promote 
trade liberalization by implementing a revenue-neutral reform reducing 
the customs tariff and increasing domestic consumption taxes, mostly 
the VAT. Flowever, this policy thrust has been shown only partially suc­
cessful in actual implementation in a number of recent empirical studies.7 
Keen (2008) provides reasons why it is difficult for developing countries 
to replace the loss of trade taxes with increased VAT revenues, and 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) find that the degree of revenue recovery 
through domestic taxes is significantly less in lower-income versus middle-
and high-income countries. While for high- and middle-income coun­
tries, this revenue recovery effect is generally effective, for low-income 
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Note: a. Based on a sample of 75 developed countries (number of countries in the sample 
varies across years) (note change in GFS methodology after 1990); for 1990-99 data not 
available. 
Sources: IMF GFS Database and World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Figure 2.4 A verage annual tax structure as a share of total taxes in 
developed countries," 1972-2005 
countries, however, this effect is weak, that is, less than 30 per cent of the 
trade tax loss could be offset by the increase of the domestic consump­
tion tax. And there is no evidence supporting that the presence of a VAT 
will bring a significant difference to the degree of recovery in low-income 
countries. 
In terms of direct taxes, the big mover and shaker is Social Security 
contributions, which experienced a significant increase over the last two 
decades, especially in developed countries and less of an increase in devel­
oping and transitional countries. Income taxes have decreased in relative 
importance in developing and transition countries, but remained rather 
flat in the case of developed countries. Using OECD data for developed 
countries shows that for this group, while personal income taxes have 
decreased, corporate income taxes have increased.8 The increases in cor­
porate income taxes have taken place despite the fact that statutory corpo­
rate tax rates have declined internationally as a response to the increasing 












Note: a. Based on a sample of nine countries in transition (number of countries in the 
sample varies across years) (note change in GFS methodology after 1990). 
Source: IMF GFS Database and World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Figure 2.5 Average annual tax structure as a share of total taxes in 
transition countries," 2000-05 
mobility of capital and firms in the last two decades in an attempt of many 
governments to remain attractive to international capital. 
A substantial body of research has put forward explanations for this 
apparent paradox. First, the broadening of the corporate tax base by 
changes in the laws has played an important role in offsetting the reduction 
of statutory tax rates (Devereux et al., 2002; Simmons, 2006; Sorensen, 
2006; Piotrowska and Vanborren, 2008). Second, income shifting from per­
sonal to corporate tax bases, or from non-corporate to the corporate sector 
due to the incentive effect of the low tax rate in the corporate sector has been 
suggested as another explanation for the paradox (Devereux and Sorensen, 
2005; De Mooij and Nicodeme, 2008). Third, an increase of corporate prof­
itability and the size of the corporate sector may have increased the effective 
tax rate and, therefore, tax revenues (Devereux et al., 2002; Devereux and 
Sorensen, 2005; Auerbach, 2006; Simmons, 2006; Clausing, 2007). 
The relative shares of property taxes and other taxes (environmental 
levies, etc.) have been fairly constant over time. 
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3 THE CHOICE OF DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT 
TAXATION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY 
AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A voluminous literature has developed over the last decades on the 
optimal design of tax systems and more in particular on the choice of 
direct versus indirect forms of taxation. In this section we give an overview 
of the main developments in these literatures and where the debate stands 
today. 
Optimal Tax Theory: What Role for Indirect Taxes? 
The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem The starting point in the optimal tax lit­
erature is the well-known Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem, which states 
that when the government may choose a general income tax function, 
individuals differ only on wage earning ability, and the utility functions are 
separable between labor and all commodities, then no indirect taxes need 
be employed. This theorem implied, as Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) noted, 
that the extent to which indirect taxes are employed may depend on the 
(more complex) form of consumer preferences and possibly on restric­
tions on the type of income taxation that can be employed; for example, 
horizontal equity considerations can introduce constraints on the struc­
ture of income taxes. The costs of tax administration are not recognized 
either; allowing for cost differences for separate taxes could also affect the 
optimal tax structure. 
The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem shaped the research agenda on optimal 
tax structures for many years to come. But, it is important to note that 
Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) saw their analysis as being more useful in shaping 
the structure of the argument regarding the choice of optimal tax structure 
than in providing policy advice. What followed Atkinson-Stiglitz's work 
has been a series of important papers showing how indirect taxes may be 
justified in an optimal tax structure if some of the explicit and also implicit 
assumptions in their work are relaxed. 
Role of tax evasion and avoidance It turns out that considering the 
administration of taxes, in particular enforcement and evasion issues have 
important consequences for the optimal tax mix of direct and indirect 
taxes. Boadway et al. (1994) show that if different taxes have different 
evasion characteristics, some optimal tax structure with a meaningful role 
for indirect taxes emerges naturally. Assuming that only income tax can 
be evaded (or can be evaded more easily)9 the authors analyze the case 
for supplementing optimal (non-linear) income taxation with commodity 
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taxation and develop conditions under which commodity taxation should 
not be at the same rate.10 
Role of uncertainty Cremer and Gahvari (1995) show that in the presence 
of uncertainty, where otherwise identical individuals are uncertain about 
the wage they would earn, differential commodity taxation is a necessary 
component of an optimal tax structure. 
Role of the production side Naito (1999) shows that, even when the gov­
ernment is using a Pareto-efficient non-linear income tax system under 
weak separability of workers' utility functions, imposing a non-uniform 
commodity tax can improve welfare, once the assumption of constant 
marginal cost of production is abandoned and the production side of the 
economy is explicitly introduced in the analysis. 
Role of heterogeneity Cremer et al. (2001) show that when individuals 
differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endow­
ments), differential commodity taxes do have a role to play as instruments 
of optimal tax policy - an optimal (general) income tax will not suffice, 
while the optimal commodity tax rates follow traditional Ramsey rules. 
Papers by Saez (2002) and Balestrino et al. (2003) make contributions 
along similar lines. 
Role of endogenous human capital accumulation Naito (2004) finds that 
using a commodity tax can increase social welfare in the presence of a 
non-linear income tax system when human capital accumulation is endog­
enous. In particular, assuming that individuals with greater ability have 
comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital, Naito 
shows that indirect redistribution such as imposing a tariff on unskilled 
human capital-intensive goods can increase the efficiency of, and comple­
ment, an income tax system. 
Transparency Dahlby (2003) argues that levying both direct and indirect 
consumption taxes could improve the transparency of the tax system, 
especially when there are several tiers of government with autonomous 
taxing powers. 
Impact on Economic Activity: Does the Selection of Direct to Indirect Tax 
Ratio Matter? 
Alongside the theoretical modeling on optimal tax structure an empiri­
cal literature has developed over the past several decades examining the 
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impact of the direct to indirect tax ratio on economic activity. The empiri­
cal findings are varied and not always consistent. While older studies tend 
to find less significant economic effects of taxes, more recent studies tend 
to find significant effects of the direct versus indirect tax mix on various 
outcomes. These differences in results have to do with the sample period of 
the studies but also with the methodology employed. 
Impact on labor supply, prices, and output An earlier paper in this lit­
erature is by Atkinson and Stern (1980), who use an extended linear 
expenditure system with United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey 
data to examine the impact of a reduction in income taxes and an increase 
in the VAT on labor supply and welfare. For labor supply they find a 
net increase in labor supply by those with the highest wage rates, with 
the income tax cut increasing hours and the VAT change reducing them. 
The analysis of welfare changes shows that the benefits of a switch from 
income tax to VAT would flow to those with higher wages. A second paper 
by Poterba et al. (1986) uses quarterly data from the United Kingdom 
and the United States to investigate how shifts in the direct versus indirect 
mix affect wages, prices, and output. The period studied for the United 
Kingdom was 1963:3 to 1983:4, while for the United States it was 1948:1 
to 1984:3. For the United Kingdom the results suggest that shifts from 
direct to indirect taxation in the short run leads to an increase in prices 
and after-tax wage and reduces real output, but that in the long run the 
shift from direct to indirect taxes seems to have no significant effects. The 
results obtained for the United States are very similar to those for the 
UK. Madsen and Damania (1996) augment Poterba et al.'s (1986) work 
to explore the impact of switches from direct to indirect taxes on both 
wages and output levels for 22 OECD countries over the period 1960 to 
1990. They conclude that for the majority of countries in the sample a 
revenue-neutral switch from direct to indirect taxes has no impact on the 
level of long-run economic activity. However, they also find that in some 
economies those tax changes have resulted in increases in output levels and 
lower nominal wages in the long run. 
More recent studies have found quite different results. A study by the 
European Commission (2006) simulates the macroeconomic effects of a 
revenue-neutral shift in taxation from direct to indirect taxes, using the 
QUEST model and shows that the shift in taxes might indeed strengthen 
economic growth and increase employment. In a more recent paper, 
Johansson et al. (2008) analyze the effects of changes in tax structure on 
GDP per capita for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 2005. 
These authors find that consumption and property taxes have a signifi­
cantly less adverse effect on GDP per capita than taxing income and that 
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corporate income taxes appear to have a particularly negative impact on 
GDP per capita. 
Impact on economic growth The strongest evidence yet that direct versus 
indirect tax choices matter is in the context of dynamic endogenous 
growth settings; this evidence points to the fact that switching the tax mix 
toward consumption taxation and away from income taxation has very 
significant growth effects or dynamic efficiency gains (Kim, 1998; Dahlby, 
2003; Li and Sarte, 2004)." In the paragraphs below we survey some of 
this empirical work, which has been mainly carried out with data from 
OECD countries. 
Kneller et al. (1999), using five-year average data for 22 OECD coun­
tries for the period 1970-95, find that while income taxes reduce growth, 
consumption taxes do not. Widmalm (2001), using panel data for 23 
OECD countries between 1965 and 1990, finds that that the proportion 
of tax revenue raised by taxing personal income is robustly, negatively 
correlated with economic growth. Widmalm also finds evidence that tax 
progressivity, measured in terms of the long-run income elasticity of tax 
revenue, tends to reduce economic growth and that progressivity affects 
growth, not so much via physical capital accumulation, as through the 
accumulation of human capital. Padovano and Galli (2001), also using 
panel data for 23 OECD countries covering the 1950s to the 1980s, 
find robust results that high marginal income rates and progressivity 
are negatively correlated with economic growth. The same conclusions 
are reached in Padovano and Galli (2002) with an updated panel of 
25 industrialized countries covering 1970 to 1998. Li and Sarte (2004) 
find evidence that the decreases in progressivity associated with the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-86) in the US lead to small but non-negligible 
increases in US long-run growth (from 0.12 to 0.34 percentage points). 
Finally, Lee and Gordon (2005), using panel data for 70 countries cov­
ering the period 1970-97, find in cross-sectional regressions and fixed-
effects regressions that higher corporate tax rates are associated with 
lower growth rates. 
Impact on income distribution The interest in the impact of tax struc­
ture on income distribution dates back to Meltzer and Richard's (1981) 
work on the majority rule and the median voter model, predicting that 
when the mean income rises relative to the median income (that of the 
decisive voter), taxes rise, and vice versa. However, their model does not 
unbundle the different taxes, although the presumption would likely be 
that the rise in taxes should take more the form of direct taxes (mostly 
paid by higher income groups) as opposed to indirect taxes (more evenly 
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distributed across all taxpayers).12 Although there is a fairly large applied 
literature on tax incidence, allocating tax burdens among different 
income groups according to a conventional set of assumptions about tax 
shifting,13 there has been less empirical work on the impact of the tax 
structure, in particular the direct to indirect tax mix on the distribution 
of income. 
Li and Sarte (2004) find that the progressivity change associated with 
the TRA-86 in the United States had a significant effect on income 
inequality, resulting in a 20 to 24 per cent increase in the Gini coefficient 
of income. More recently, Weller (2007) uses cross-country data from 
1981 to 2002 and finds positive effects of progressive taxation on income 
distribution. An important handicap, explaining the few studies avail­
able, is the difficulty of putting together compatible panel data on income 
distribution. 
Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) examine whether income ine­
quality is affected by the structural progressivity of national income tax 
systems and find that while progressivity reduces observed inequality in 
reported gross and net income, it has a significantly smaller impact on true 
inequality, approximated by consumption-based measures of Gini. 
Impact on macroeconomic stability Even though the built-in stabiliz­
ing properties of tax structures have been a noted issue since Musgrave 
(1959), little empirical work has been conducted to estimate the impact of 
different tax structures and in particular the role of the direct to indirect 
tax mix in increasing macroeconomic stability, the presumption being that 
tax systems that rely more heavily on direct taxation will contribute more 
effectively to macroeconomic stability.14 Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) 
examined the tax system's potential to stabilize income fluctuations in the 
US economy since the early 1960s and find that that automatic stabiliza­
tion of aggregate demand probably offsets as much as 8 per cent of the 
initial shocks to GDP. In addition, they find that there has been relatively 
little net change in the role of the tax system as an automatic stabilizer; 
the US tax system effectiveness in stabilizing aggregate demand in 1995 
was roughly the same as in the early 1960s, but lower than at its estimated 
peak in 1981. In a more recent study, Weller (2007), using cross-country 
data for 1981 to 2002, finds the relationship between progressive taxes and 
growth volatility to be ambiguous. 
In Section 5 of this chapter we revisit the questions of the potential eco­
nomic impact of the direct to indirect tax mix on economic growth, macro-
stability, and income distribution using a unified international panel data 
set. But before doing that we examine in the next section the determinants 
of the tax mix ratio. 
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4 THE DETERMINANTS OF THE DIRECT TO 
INDIRECT TAX RATIO 
In this section we examine the determinants of the direct to indirect tax 
ratio, building on recent work by Kenny and Winer (2006) and Hines and 
Summers (2009) on the determinants of the different components of tax 
structures. Our central question is: in practice, what are the main determi­
nants of the proportion in which direct and indirect taxes are used? This 
is a broad question and we are interested in the different aspects of the 
economy and societal institutions that may bear on this issue. In the first 
part of the section we discuss a number of methodological issues and in 
the second part we present the panel data set and the estimation results. 
Empirical Approach 
We estimate the following model using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methodology with panel corrected standard errors,15 including country 
dummies to account for any potential individual fixed effects: 
Tax Ratio= X$ + t), +  £ „ ; / =  1,. ,  n ,  t  =  1,. . . ,  T  (2.1) 
where i indexes country and t indexes year, and n, represents the country-
specific fixed effects. The Tax Ratio is measured as the ratio of direct taxes 
(personal and corporate income tax, payroll tax, Social Security contribu­
tions, and property tax) and indirect taxes (taxes on goods and services, 
taxes on international trade, and other taxes). The tax data represent 
consolidated general government data and are drawn from the IMF GFS 
Database. Given that certain types of property taxes can be treated as 
direct and some as indirect taxes, and because we are not able to distin­
guish among different types within the data we have, we will alternatively 
estimate the model using a dependent variable where the property tax is 
included as an indirect tax in the denominator. 
Alternative definitions of the dependent variable, the direct to indirect 
tax ratio are possible. For example, Poterba et al. (1986) use in their 
analysis of how tax systems may affect wages, prices, and output a direct 
to indirect tax mix variable defined as the difference between the direct and 
the indirect tax rates computed as (x - 0)/(l + 0) where x is the direct tax 
rate and 0 the indirect tax rate, and these tax rates computed, respectively, 
as total direct and indirect taxes divided by nominal GDP. This alternative 
definition is highly correlated with our measure of TaxRatio, the simple 
correlation coefficient for the two measures in our panel data set being 
0.841.16 
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The set of observable characteristics Xu that we hypothesize to affect 
the tax ratio is selected following the work in Kenny and Winer (2006) 
and Hines and Summers (2009).17 The first paper by Kenny and Winer 
(2006) examines the determinants of the structure of tax systems using a 
sample of 100 democratic and non-democratic countries over the period 
1975-92. For estimation purposes, Kenny and Winer (2006) use an SUR 
(seemingly unrelated regression) approach to test for whether and how the 
set of explanatory variables matters for each of the tax instruments in a 
country's tax system. Since our variable of interest is the ratio of direct to 
indirect taxes rather than individual taxes per se, we should not expect to 
find the same relationships (signs and significance) between the respective 
explanatory variables and our dependent variable based on Kenny and 
Winer's (2006) results. Nevertheless, their study provides a very useful 
guide on the channels through which particular determinants may be 
expected to influence the direct to indirect tax ratio. 
The second study by Hines and Summers (2009) examines the effect of 
globalization on tax design using cross-country data over the period 1972 
to 2006. In cross-sectional regressions for 1973, 1985, and 1999 they find 
that the reliance on income taxes (personal income taxes and corporate 
income taxes) on total taxes is higher the larger the country (log popula­
tion) and the wealthier the country (log per capita income) with this reli­
ance increasing over time.18 For expenditure taxes (taxes on goods and 
services and international trade taxes), the cross-sectional regressions for 
1973, 1985, and 1999 suggest that country size and per capita income are 
consistently associated with smaller ratios of expenditure taxes to total tax 
revenues. The panel evidence is quite consistent with the cross-sectional 
evidence. Growing income levels are associated with reduced reliance on 
expenditure taxes (44.2 percent), and population growth is likewise associ­
ated with less use of expenditure taxes. 
The determinants of the tax mix ratio may be categorized into 'demand' 
factors and 'supply' factors. By demand factors we mean those that pull 
the level of certain taxes or the overall level of taxation up because of pref­
erences or the overall budget constraint of the public sector; if more public 
goods and services are desired, more taxes on private income will need to 
be raised. Supply factors represent those that facilitate the collection of 
certain taxes or all taxes in general, such as the availability of tax bases or 
'tax handles', and institutional and structural features that facilitate tax 
administration and enforcement. 
Among the demand factors, we identify first several forms of 'scale 
effects'. The size of total revenue to GDP measures how much overall 
government a particular society wishes to have. As the size of government 
gets larger, it is likely that most or all revenue categories (measured as a 
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share of GDP) will need to rise, but there is no clear reason why direct or 
indirect taxes would have to rise faster. There are also additional scale 
effects arising from the size of the country measured by population and 
from the degree of decentralization in a country. A larger population and 
thus more congestion may lead to higher tax levels, and with decentraliza­
tion the consolidated government sector is also likely to be larger; both of 
these factors are likely to lead to a more intense use of different tax sources 
but without a clear decantation a priori for higher use of either direct or 
indirect taxes. Another demand factor is that of 'political preferences'. 
For example, repressive regimes may turn away from sources requiring 
higher degrees of citizen cooperation or voluntary compliance, such as 
income taxes; for the opposite reasons, more democratic regimes may turn 
toward those types of taxes. Thus, we may expect that higher degrees of 
democratic liberties may lead to higher direct to indirect tax ratios. But the 
political color of democratic regimes may also have an impact on the direct 
to indirect ratio. Kenny and Winer (2006) find that socialist governments 
substituted toward corporate taxes on goods and services, which does not 
lead to a clear prediction in terms of direct versus indirect taxes. Another 
important political factor may be collective preferences for redistribution 
and overall more equitable societies. We may assume that 'redistribution' 
is a normal or even superior good with income elasticity positive or greater 
than one; if so, the variable per capita income may capture this effect. 
Moving on to the 'supply factors', we need to identify features that 
make it easier (more difficult) to raise tax revenues from different sources. 
In the list are those that Kenny and Winer call 'tax base effects', meaning 
that countries will be attracted to use taxes for which there are relatively 
larger tax bases available. For example, major oil-producing countries 
may have larger non-tax revenues shares and also easy access to addi­
tional revenues via the corporate income tax due to the profits from the 
exploitation of oil reserves. In this case we would expect the significance 
of oil production in a country to be associated with higher direct to indi­
rect tax ratios. Similarly, a higher direct to indirect ratio may come from 
relatively larger tax bases for personal income tax (measured by real GDP 
per worker), and payroll taxes (proxied by the labor force participation). 
On the other hand, taxes on domestic goods and services have larger bases 
in the formal sector in countries in which more people live in urban areas. 
This may lead to a lower direct to indirect tax ratio. Similarly, countries 
with more open economies would tend to rely more on trade and other 
indirect taxes given the easier collection of VAT and excises at the ports 
of entry. An additional set of supply factors, not entirely distinguishable 
from the previous one, is that of 'administration costs', including among 
other things the ability to provide taxpayer services and conduct tax 
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enforcement activities. Urbanization may capture the effect of administra­
tion costs on tax structure. Because of the higher population density in 
urban areas, monitoring of tax compliance may become less expensive, 
implying overall higher tax compliance. However, the impact of urbani­
zation on tax compliance may be more complicated than that (Kau and 
Rubin, 1981). Because people live close to their neighbors in urban set­
tings, informal transactions become more feasible, which in turn will tend 
to reduce tax collections of both indirect and direct taxes. 
Summarizing, the set of observable characteristics Xu we include as 
explanatory variables in our analysis of the tax mix is as follows: 
1. Demand factors: 
- total revenue (including tax and non-tax revenue) to GDP ratio; 
- log population, normalized by dividing it by the annual mean of 
this variable; 
- dummy for country's formal federal structure; 
- expenditure decentralization, calculated as the ratio of state and 
local expenditures to total expenditures; 
- democracy index; 
- dummy for socialist government; 
- log GDP per capita, normalized by dividing it by the annual mean 
of this variable; 
2. Supply factors: 
- domestic crude petrol per capita production; 
- labor force participation; 
- trade openness, measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to 
GDP; 
- share of agriculture in GDP19 
- globalization index; 
- percentage of urban population.20 
To be sure, there are several departures in our approach from that used 
by Kenny and Winer (2006). Besides the different dependent variables, we 
employ a slightly larger sample of 116 developed, developing, and transi­
tional countries and observe a longer time period, between 1972 and 2005. 
Furthermore, we utilize a different regression specification based on some 
theoretical assumptions on the determinants of the tax mix and use annual 
data rather than creating subsample averages.21 Our analysis covers the 
full sample of countries but we also run separate regressions for developed 
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and developing countries to check for potentially separate effects due to 
differences in economic structure. 
Like Kenny and Winer, we allow for the endogeneity of certain right-
hand variables. But, in addition, we correct for autocorrelation. Let's 
first address the possible presence of endogeneity among some of the 
explanatory variables. Kenny and Winer (2006) account for the possible 
endogeneity of government size (proxied by the ratio of total revenue to 
GDP) although with or without correction for endogeneity, the inclusion 
of this variable in the regression has very little impact on their results.22 
Given that our dependent variable is the ratio between direct and indirect 
taxes rather than individual tax instruments, the reverse causality between 
the direct to indirect tax ratio and total revenue to GDP variable is less 
likely to be present. We test for endogeneity in total revenue to GDP using 
the same instruments as Kenny and Winer (2006), absolute latitude of the 
country's largest city, scaled to take values between 0 and 1, and voter 
turnout rate, but fail to detect it.23 
A second issue is the need to correct for autocorrelation.24 Since we 
detect the existence of the first-order panel-specific autocorrelation in 
our model, we estimate the model with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSEs), as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995).2526 
Estimation Results 
Table 2.1 presents the estimated effects obtained by using the annual data 
and applying panel corrected standard errors to the full sample to correct 
for panel-specific autocorrelation.27 The highly significant and positive 
estimated effect of total revenue to GDP ratio suggests that countries with 
larger government size tend to rely more on direct taxes (10 percentage 
points increase in total revenue to GDP leads to an increase in the direct 
to indirect tax ratio by between 2.1 and 3.7 percentage points). 
For population size, recent evidence suggests that countries with smaller 
populations have relatively mobile tax bases and as a result they rely 
relatively less on corporate and personal income taxes than other coun­
tries (Hines and Summers, 2009). These countries instead rely more on 
expenditure-type taxes, tax on goods and services, and import tariffs. Our 
results strongly support those previous findings. 
The significant results for the federal structure dummy variable suggest 
that federal countries tend to rely relatively more on direct taxation. 
Furthermore, the degree of expenditure decentralization seems to be 
on average not significant in deciding the tax mix, but when we observe 
developed and developing countries separately, we find the expenditure 
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has the opposite signs in the subsamples, negative for developed countries 
and positive for developed countries; but note that the economic effect is 
quite small in both cases.28 
For factors representing political preferences, we find that on average 
more democracy implies higher direct to indirect tax ratios; however, for 
the subsamples, the coefficient for developed countries is also significant 
but takes an unexpected negative sign.29 We find no evidence that coun­
tries in transition from socialism tend to show a marked reliance on either 
direct or indirect taxes.20 The estimated coefficients for GDP per capita are 
not statistically significant, except for developing countries, which takes a 
negative sign. 
On the supply side, the effect of globalization on the tax ratio appears 
to be statistically significant and negative, which is consistent with the 
widely accepted conjecture that with increasing globalization all countries 
are becoming small open economies being forced to lower their reliance 
on direct taxes vis-a-vis indirect taxes.3' Furthermore, in line with the 
expectations, taxes on domestic goods and services are more important in 
countries in which more people live in urban areas. 
Our results suggest a very significant negative and robust effect of 
urbanization, our proxy for domestic indirect tax base, on the direct to 
indirect tax mix.32 Finally, a more educated population can facilitate the 
implementation of taxes, such as the personal income tax, that require 
more ability to fill out sophisticated tax forms. Our results indicate that 
increased education leads to greater reliance on direct taxes. This result is 
quite robust to alternative specifications. 
5 RELEVANCE OF THE DIRECT TO INDIRECT TAX 
RATIO IN THE REAL ECONOMY 
In this section of the chapter we use a fairly large panel data set of devel­
oping and developed countries to explore the empirical significance of the 
direct to indirect tax choices countries make for their tax systems on four 
important dimensions of macroeconomic performance; economic growth, 
macro-stability, income inequality, and foreign direct investment. 
On Economic Growth 
With little doubt the most commonly thought but nevertheless contro­
versial effect of high reliance of tax systems on direct taxes versus indirect 
taxes is its negative impact on economic growth. In the review of the litera­
ture above we have seen that a number of recent studies provide empirical 
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evidence, albeit not always consistent, of the negative long-term growth 
effects of direct taxes, particularly corporate income taxes and progressive 
personal income taxes. Our goal here is to explore more specifically the 
potential role of the direct to indirect tax ratio on economic growth. To 
extrapolate from the most recent empirical literature we should anticipate 
that higher direct tax to indirect tax ratios should lead to lower rates of 
economic growth all other things being equal. The empirical literature on 
economic growth is vast and ever growing.33 Our analysis in this section 
builds on a fairly recent study by Lee and Gordon (2005), analyzing the 
potential role of corporate taxes on economic growth and based on a panel 
data set for 70 countries over the period 1980-97. 
In this section, besides adding the direct to indirect tax ratio vari­
able, we introduce several other modifications to Lee and Gordon's 
(2005) approach.34 First, we extend the sample period by eight years to 
1972-2005, while we proceed to divide it into seven subsample periods: 
one three-year period (1972-74), five five-year periods (1975-79, 1980-84, 
1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99), and one six-year period (2000-05); following 
Lee and Gordon we regress the average subsample GDP (real) per capita 
growth rate on the tax variable and the other control variables. Second, we 
expand the sample size from 70 to 116 countries. We proceed to estimate 
the following equation: 
GDPgu = uTaxRatio,, + X,$ + u, + e„, /' = 1,...,«, t = 1,. . . ,  T  (2.2) 
where i indicates country and t denotes subsample period, GDPg repre­
sents average subsample GDP (real) per capita growth rate, TaxRatio is 
the average subsample direct to indirect tax ratio, Xu represents a set of 
control variables affecting GDP growth, including: GDP per capita in the 
initial subsample year in US$ 10 000, the initial subsample year top mar­
ginal corporate tax rate, the initial subsample year of the primary school 
enrollment, average subsample openness (measured as sum of import 
and export to GDP), the average subsample International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) index, the average subsample population growth rate, and 
average subsample inflation rate. 
Before we proceed, we need to address several issues concerning the 
estimation strategy. First, there is the possibility that the direct to indirect 
tax ratio variable is endogenous; for example, countries with faster growth 
may increasingly rely on direct taxes for equity or economic stability 
reasons. In order to address this issue, we use an instrumental variable for 
the tax ratio variable that is calculated in a similar way to the instrumen­
tal variable for the corporate tax rate used by Lee and Gordon (2005). In 
particular, we first instrument each direct to indirect tax ratio observation 
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with the weighted average of the tax ratios for all other countries in the 
corresponding year, where the weights are the inverse of the distance (as 
described below) between the two countries. The value of the tax ratio 
instrumental variable for country i in year t, Tax Ratio IV,, is, therefore, 
calculated as: 
1 n 1 
TaxRatioIV,, = _ —TaxRatio,,; i # j (2.3) 
1 J - ' d j  
J = 1  d j  
where dj is the distance between the largest cities in country i and country 
j, and TaxRatioij, is the tax ratio in country j in year t. The underlying 
intuition for using this particular instrument is that economic growth in a 
country relative to others generally should not have an effect on the design 
of the tax mix of those other countries, so the dependent variable should 
not be correlated with the instrument. On the other hand, the design of 
the tax mix in a country should be affected by the design of the tax mix in 
the neighboring countries, this effect being especially strong in the case of 
small countries.35 Because we use the corporate tax rate in our regressions, 
which is the tax variable of interest for Lee and Gordon (2005), we also 
reproduce their steps regarding the instrumentation of the corporate tax 
rate variable. 
Second, before applying the instrumental variable methodology, we 
perform a Hausman test for endogeneity concerning the direct to indirect 
tax ratio variable and the corporate tax rate. The Hausman tests reject the 
null hypothesis that OLS is a consistent estimator, providing support for 
using instrumental variables methodology. The overidentification test has 
a P-value of 0.9, suggesting that we fail to reject the hypothesis that all 
excluded instruments are exogenous. 
Third, following Lee and Gordon (2005) we use a battery of estimation 
approaches: first, we employ ordinary least squares regression, robust 
regression, and median regression to check for the robustness to the out­
liers; second, we use panel estimation including fixed effects36 regression 
and the instrumental variable regression with country dummies. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.2 for the case when our 
main independent variable of interest, the direct to indirect tax ratio, 
includes property taxes as direct taxes.37 The most relevant finding from 
our perspective is that higher direct to indirect tax ratios appear to have 
a significant and negative impact on economic growth. From the robust 
regression and median regressions in Table 2.2 we can see that the esti­
mated coefficient for the tax ratio is quite robust to outliers. After control­
ling for individual country effects, the impact of the tax ratio variable on 
Table 2.2 Direct indirect tax ratio and economic growth regressions for subsample periods, 1972-2005 (dependent 
variable: GDP per capita growth rate for subsample periods) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OLS Robust Median Fixed Country Dummies + IV 
Effect Full Developed Developing Full Developed Developing 
Tax ratio2 -0.248 -0.323** -0.338* -0.872*** -3.910** -5.575** -2.429 20.107 -4.293 0.272 
(0.179) (0.147) (0.178) (0.284) (1.575) (2.774) (2.791) (20.683) (3.321) (4.058) 
Corp tax rateb -0.028* -0.034** -0.031* -0.052*** -0.092*** -0.055* 0.057 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.033) (0.032) (0.099) 
-12.399*** GDP per capb -0.891*** -0.775*** -0.929*** -1.924*** -1.654*** -2.401*** -11.247* -3.805 -1.733*** 
(0.243) (0.246) (0.319) (0.549) (0.559) (0.705) (6.304) (2.382) (0.557) (3.565) 
Primary 0.026 0.016 0.041** -0.035 -0.089** -0.141** -0.076 0.070 -0.145* -0.076** 
enrollb (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.045) (0.070) (0.052) (0.125) (0.081) (0.038) 
Av. openness 0.672** 0.641** 0.569 3.825*** 4.475*** 2.282 3.880 -2.373 3.279*** 2.179 
(0.332) (0.285) (0.375) (1.156) (1.327) (1.527) (4.101) (5.287) (0.981) (1.743) 
Av. ICRG 0.316 0.319* 0.499** 0.417 
Index (0.195) (0.170) (0.221) (0.393) 
Pop. gr. rate -1.211*** -1.107*** -1.057*** -1.084** 
(0.227) (0.177) (0.231) (0.425) 
Av. inflation -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 2.337 3.325* 0.302 8.288** 
(1.924) (1.722) (2.230) (3.471) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 
R-squared 0.37 0.34 0.28 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a. Property taxes treated as direct taxes. 
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economic growth remains negative and significant and this overall result 
is also maintained after we control for the potential endogeneity of the tax 
ratio and corporate tax rate variables. 
However, when we divide the full sample into subsamples for developed 
and developing countries some of the results change. In the case of devel­
oped countries, the direct to indirect tax ratio continues to have a negative 
and highly significant effect on economic growth. In the case of develop­
ing countries, even though the coefficient is negative, it is not statistically 
significant. 
For the rest of the control variables, we obtain comparable results 
to those in the previous literature including Lee and Gordon (2005). 
The coefficient on initial subsample GDP per capita is negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the assumption of the conditional 
convergence of growth rates reported in previous studies (Barro, 1991; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Kneller et al., 1999). Inflation affects economic 
growth rate negatively, supporting the hypothesis that, among other 
things, inflation increases investment uncertainty and, therefore, reduces 
economic agents' incentives to invest (Padovano and Galli, 2001 and 
2002; Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2008). Trade openness has a posi­
tive and significant effect on the growth rate, which is consistent with 
previous findings (Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1998; Frankel and Romer, 
1999; and Dollar and Kraay, 2003). The results for institutional factors 
(measured by the ICRG index) are not robust to changes in estimation 
methodology; there is also less consensus in the empirical literature con­
cerning the role of these factors.38 Lastly, note that the results for the rest 
of the control variables are overall of lower statistical significance for the 
subsample of developing countries. Because of the very high standard 
errors and high R-squared of the regression we may suspect the presence 
of multicollinearity.39 
On Macroeconomic Stability 
One of the well-known benefits of direct taxes is that they can act as auto­
matic stabilizers.40 Progressive personal income taxes tend to withdraw 
proportionally more private income during economic expansions and 
less so during contractions of the economy. Similarly, corporate income 
taxes yield higher revenues when profits are high in the expansion phase 
of the business cycle but they drop considerably in the contraction phase. 
On the other hand, indirect taxes, such as the VAT or excises, lack these 
stabilizing features. To explore the role of tax structure in terms of the 
direct to indirect tax composition on macroeconomic stability, we employ 
a simple regression model in which we regress the volatility of economic 
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growth, measured by the standard deviation of GDP growth rate within 
each subsample period, on the direct to indirect tax ratio and a set of other 
explanatory variables. For the basic specification of the regression equa­
tion we follow the work of Easterly et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2001). 
These other control variables include the 'volatility of inflation' (meas­
ured by the standard deviation of the inflation rate within the subsample 
period), 'average openness', and 'average GDP per capita'. The direct to 
indirect tax ratio captures the effect of automatic stabilizers on economic 
stability while average openness and the volatility of inflation are included 
as proxies for the degrees to which the economy is exposed to real and 
monetary shocks; average GDP per capita is intended to capture any pos­
sible relationship between wealth and economic volatility. 
For estimation purposes we use the sample of 116 developed, develop­
ing and transitional countries, over the period 1972-2005 and as in other 
sections we divide the sample in seven subsample periods (one three-year 
period [1972-74], five five-year periods [1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 
1990-94, 1995-99], and one six-year period [2000-05]). For the independ­
ent variable of interest, the direct to indirect tax ratio, we use two alterna­
tive measures, one treating property tax as a direct tax ('tax ratio 1') and 
the other treating it as an indirect tax ('tax ratio 2'); below we only report 
the results for 'tax ratio 1' since the results obtained using 'tax ratio 2' are 
fundamentally the same. 
We proceed to estimate the following equation: 
SD_GDPglt = a. Tax Ratio,, + a2Tax Ratio], + o^TotalTax,, 
+ ctATaxRatiott * TotalTax,, + X$ + e„; i = 1t = \,... T 
(2.4) 
where i indicates country and t denotes subsample period. The dependent 
variable, SD_GDPg, is measured as the subsample standard deviation of 
annual GDP (real) per capita growth rate. TaxRatio is the average sub-
sample direct to indirect tax ratio, and TotalTax is the average subsample 
total tax to GDP. Finally, Xu represents a set of control variables affecting 
GDP growth volatility, including: the subsample standard deviation of 
Ml annual growth rate,41 the average subsample openness (measured as 
sum of import and export to GDP), and the average subsample GDP per 
capita. 
For the choice of the correct panel data estimation procedure, we 
perform a Hausman test for selecting between the fixed and random effects 
approaches and fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients esti­
mated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
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Table 2.3a Tax ratio and economic stability, subsample periods, 
1972-2005, random effects estimation (dependent variable: 
standard deviation of annual GDP growth rate) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Random Effects Random Effects IV 
Full Developed Developing Full Developed Developing 
Tax ratio -0.934 -1.043 -1.186** -1.556* -0.896 -3.383** 
(0.663) (2.092) (0.543) (0.841) (2.118) (1.651) 
Tax ratio 0.246** 0.631* 0.004 0.240* 0.640* 0.201 
squared (0.110) (0.351) (0.095) (0.130) (0.353) (0.210) 
Total tax 1.445 18.693 -1.076 -4.449 21.537 -19.281 
(3.693) (13.715) (2.977) (5.245) (14.712) (12.496) 
Tax ratio -0.028 -0.104* 0.033 0.006 -0.111* 0.091 
* Total tax (0.021) (0.057) (0.020) (0.028) (0.059) (0.055) 
SD Ml 1.909 -36.364 -3.915 5.428 137.684 16.403 
(11.644) (710.348) (9.405) (12.329) (780.403) (19.007) 
Average 1.061** -0.970 0.091 3.902*** -2.009 8.664* 
openness (0.422) (1.539) (0.369) (1.331) (2.440) (4.887) 
Average GDP 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.080*** 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.025 
per capita (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.031) 
Constant 60.346 237.137 36.391 -50.070 237.816 -131.435 
(71.999) (349.230) (53.486) (106.041) (350.788) (151.119) 
Observations 256 59 197 256 59 197 
Number of id 89 17 72 89 17 72 
R-squared 0.69 0.76 0.82 0.57 0.75 0.31 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors. 
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator, allowing us to use the 
random effects procedure.42 
We may suspect the potential endogeneity of the trade variable. For 
example, countries with more stable output growth may be more inclined 
to liberalize trade barriers. Even though the Hausman test fails to reject 
the hypothesis of no endogeneity for trade openness, we perform both 
random effects estimations, with and without an instrumental variable for 
trade openness. The results obtained using random effects are reported in 
Table 2.3a, while Table 2.3b presents the results obtained by applying the 
fixed effects estimation methodology. We instrument trade openness with 
the weighted average of the trade openness for all other countries in the 
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Table 2.3b Tax ratio and economic stability, subsample periods, 
1972-2005, fixed effects estimation (dependent variable: 
standard deviation of annual GDP growth rate) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects IV 
Full Developed Developing Full Developed Developing 
Tax ratio -1.037 1.485 -4.546 -1.037 1.485 -4.546 
(1.517) (8.445) (5.028) (1.517) (8.445) (5.028) 
Tax ratio 0.248 1.088 0.719 0.248 1.088 0.719 
squared (0.204) (0.723) (0.564) (0.204) (0.723) (0.564) 
Total tax 12.643 25.674 6.059 12.643 25.674 6.059 
(11.136) (58.855) (26.234) (11.136) (58.855) (26.234) 
Tax ratio -0.017 -0.125 -0.043 -0.017 -0.125 -0.043 
* Total tax (0.047) (0.223) (0.120) (0.047) (0.223) (0.120) 
SDMI 7.572 -544.237 15.437 7.572 -544.237 15.437 
(14.603) (855.686) (23.429) (14.603) (855.686) (23.429) 
Average 4.922 0.390 24.257 4.922 0.390 24.257 
openness (4.642) (8.625) (23.924) (4.642) (8.625) (23.924) 
Average GDP 0.002 0.010 -0.295 0.002 0.010 -0.295 
per capita (0.018) (0.032) (0.273) (0.018) (0.032) (0.273) 
Constant -243.824 -423.950 -671.252 -243.824 -423.950 -671.252 
(308.514) (1,913.955) (694.173) (308.514) (1,913.955) (694.173) 
Observations -1.037 1.485 -4.546 -1.037 1.485 -4.546 
Number of id (1.517) (8.445) (5.028) (1.517) (8.445) (5.028) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors. 
corresponding subsample period, where the weights are the inverse of the 
distance (as described below) between the two countries. The value of the 
trade instrumental variable for country i in year t is, therefore, calculated 
as; 
TradeIV,, = 1—- 2"_, ~7TradeJt; i + j (2.5) 
J ' aj 
~/-t dj 
where d, is the distance between the largest cities in country i and country 
j, and Trade j, is the trade openness of country j in year t. 
In the regressions we allow for a non-linear relationship between the tax 
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ratio variable and economic stability by including a squared term. In addi­
tion, the different specifications are estimated using separate subsamples 
for developed and developing countries to allow for potentially different 
responses due to different fundamental economic structures. 
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that the direct to indirect 
tax ratio has a significant negative effect on economic volatility. There is 
only weak evidence that this relationship between the direct to indirect 
tax ratio and economic volatility may be quadratic.43 When the quadratic 
term is significant, the implied threshold for the tax ratio starting to have 
a positive effect on economic instability has an improbable value as high 
as 6.5 times greater reliance on direct taxes relative to indirect taxes.44 
Furthermore, within the subsample of developed countries, the direct to 
indirect tax ratio has more automatic stabilizing power in countries with 
higher total tax to GDP ratios. 
For the other control variables, it appears that the volatility of Ml has 
no significant effect on economic stability. On the other hand, trade open­
ness is shown to be positively correlated with economic volatility in the 
cases of the full sample and the subsample of developing countries; this 
suggests that the more exposed the economy is to outside real shocks, the 
more prone the economy is to volatility, as previously found in Easterly 
et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2001). Last, average GDP per capita has a 
positive effect on economic volatility, and this effect is more pronounced 
among the subsample of developed countries. 
On Income Inequality 
Our interest here is to investigate the importance of the direct to indirect 
tax ratio as a determinant of income inequality in a country. The general 
presumption is that greater vertical equity and more equal income distri­
butions require a more progressive tax system, which means that direct 
taxes (generally expected to be progressive) would need to be relatively 
more important than indirect taxes (typically expected to be regressive or 
less progressive) in tax systems. The evidence in the empirical literature on 
this issue is mixed,45 and our own empirical findings in this section do not 
offer any strong support to the conjecture that the direct versus indirect 
composition of taxes plays an important role on observed inequality in 
distribution of income. However, this conclusion is subject to the impor­
tant caveat of the difficulties involved in measuring inequality in income 
distribution across countries and over time. 
In investigating the importance of the direct-indirect tax balance on 
income inequality and redistribution we focus on the evolution of the Gini 
coefficient for income distribution. The Gini coefficient is computed on the 
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basis of income distributions using different concepts of income, including 
gross income, net income, and consumption. This presents some measure­
ment and comparability issues that we can only partially address below. 
We are interested in finding out how the direct-indirect tax mix and a set 
of other explanatory variables has affected the Gini coefficient over time in 
our sample of countries. 
The empirical model we estimate is: 
Gini,, = a. Tax Ratio lt + a2TotalTax„ + a{Tax Ratio * TotalTaxlt 
+ X$ + GiniConcept), + £„;/= 1,.  . . ,  n ,  t  =  1,. .  . ,  T  (2.6) 
where i indicates country and t denotes years. Gini is the Gini coefficient as 
a measure of income inequality46 over time and across countries; X„ is the 
set of observable characteristics that affect income inequality, including: 
the initial Gini coefficient, the direct-indirect tax ratio, total tax collection 
to GDP, GDP per capita growth rate, private credit as a percentage of 
GDP, labor force participation, openness (measured by the ratio of import 
plus export to GDP) dependency ratio, and dummy for EU15. The set of 
explanatory variables, except for the direct-indirect tax ratio, represents 
a consensus specification in the empirical literature on aggregate income 
distribution. 
In the estimation we employ annual data for a sample of 116 devel­
oped, developing, and transitional countries, over the period 1972 to 
2005. For the estimation we apply a 2SLS procedure to control for the 
potential reverse causality between income inequality and the financial 
system (measured by the share of private credit in GDP) and between 
income inequality and the direct to indirect tax mix. As suggested by 
Beck et al. (2004), the reverse causality between income inequality and 
private credit might take the form that reductions in inequality may lead 
to higher demand for more efficient financial systems. Following Fa Porta 
et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2004), we use as instrumental variables for 
the financial system, latitude (the scaled absolute value of) as well as legal 
origin (English, French, and German). We have already discussed in the 
previous section the rationale for using these variables as instruments for 
GDP per capita growth; a similar intuition applies to the case of financial 
development and so it will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the poten­
tial endogeneity between income inequality and the tax mix may arise 
from the fact that countries with higher income inequality may tend to 
rely more on direct taxes in order to reduce it. In order to test and correct 
for endogeneity in the tax mix ratio, we instrument the direct-indirect tax 
ratio with the weighted average of the tax ratio for all other countries in 
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the corresponding year, where the weights are the inverse of the distance 
(as described below) between the two countries. The value of the tax mix 
instrumental variable for country i in year t is, therefore, calculated as: 
1 n 1 
TaxRatioIVit = _ —TaxRatio,;, i + j (2.7) 
1  J - 1  d j  
A= i dj 
where di is the distance between the largest cities in country i and country j, 
and TaxRatiOj, is the direct-indirect tax mix of country j in year /. 
The Hausman test for endogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that OLS 
is a consistent estimator for both private credit and the tax ratio, provid­
ing support for using the 2SLS procedure. For the instrumental variables 
2SLS procedure we estimate first stage equations as below with latitude, 
and legal origin as instruments in the private credit equation and the 
weighted tax ratio for all other countries as the instrument in the tax mix 
equation:47 
Credit„ = Z„5 + a, + j = 1,t = 1,. . . ,  T  (2.8) 
Tax Ra t i o  h  = Z„ y + a, + v((; / = 1,..., n, t = 1,. .., T (2.9) 
where Z„ includes all exogenous variables from Equation (2.6) plus the 
instruments, and £(Z;,u„) = = 0. 
To carry out the panel estimation we perform a Hausman test for 
selecting between fixed and random effects estimation on the basis of 
the second-stage equation, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the 
same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator, allow­
ing us to use the random effects procedure. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.4. Our main interest is 
in the relationship between income inequality and the direct to indirect 
tax structure. The expectation, based on the past literature, is that of a 
negative relationship, albeit possibly weak between the direct to indirect 
tax mix and income distribution. The results in Table 2.4, overall, provide 
at best weak support for the conjecture. Our results suggest that the effect 
of the tax ratio on income inequality depends on the size of the taxation 
system: in countries with relatively smaller tax systems, the tax ratio tends 
to have a positive effect on income inequality, whereas its negative (equal­
izing) effect increases with enlarged tax systems. For the full sample, the 
tax ratio mix has negative effect on the Gini coefficient (reducing income 
inequality) in countries with shares of total taxes in GDP larger than 0.29. 
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Table 2.4 Direct to indirect tax ratio and income inequality, 1972-2005, 
2SLS estimations (dependent variable: Gini coefficient (%o)) 
0) (2) (3) 
Full Sample Developed Countries Developing 
Countries 
Initial Gini 0.74*** 0.30** 0.65*** 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) 
Tax ratio 10.04* 15.05** 1.17 
(5.95) (6.68) (6.67) 
Total taxes 60.28* 95.02*** 8.74 
(33.84) (36.77) (25.84) 
Tax ratio * -35.21* -44.31** -5.95 
Total taxes (19.58) (18.86) (24.48) 
Private credit -4.73* 3.51 0.60 
(2.53) (3.20) (4.69) 
GDP per capita -0.02 0.10 -0.04 
growth (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) 
LFP 0.06 -0.07 -0.11 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) 
Dependency ratio 3.55 22.29* -9.66 
(6.29) (11.79) (8.20) 
EU15 -3.48** -0.19 0.00 
(1.48) (1.89) (0.00) 
Openness 2.04** 0.35 0.57 
(0.80) (1.43) (1.74) 
Net income -2.11*** -1.55 0.10 
Gini concept (0.77) (1.12) (0.77) 
Consumption -3.69*** -2.53** -2.82*** 
Gini concept (0.88) (1.20) (0.71) 
Constant -7.18 -19.66 29.49** 
(17.42) (24.30) (12.58) 
Observations 447 274 173 
Number of id 62 25 37 
R-squared 0.64 0.31 0.65 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors. 
This threshold is larger in developed countries (0.34); for the subsample of 
developing countries there is no statistically significant effect. This latter 
pattern seems to fit the conventional wisdom on the low impact of tax 
systems on the distribution of income for developing countries (Bird and 
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Zolt, 2005; Harberger, 2006). But we must note that once we control for 
unobserved individual country effects by adding the individual country 
dummies, the importance of direct to indirect tax ratio in terms of income 
inequality seems to practically vanish in all equations. 
For the other control variables, the results largely follow those in the 
previous empirical literature on the determinants of aggregate income 
distribution.48 Following Beck et al. (2004), we include the initial level of 
the Gini coefficient at the beginning of the observation period as one of 
the explanatory variables to capture the country's initial conditions. The 
initial level of inequality has a strong positive effect, especially for devel­
oping countries, on observed inequality. The coefficient for the level of 
financial development takes a negative and significant sign, as expected, 
but only for the full sample. 
There is a broad literature emphasizing the role of education as one 
of the major factors affecting the degree of income inequality. Even 
though policy-makers usually justify higher educational spending as an 
effective tool for reducing income inequality, the theoretical predictions 
about this relationship are ambiguous and the empirical findings are 
not consistent.49 Years of schooling in the total population as a measure 
of education has a positive and significant effect on income inequality 
but only for developing countries. We also include a dummy for the 15 
old European Union member states to control for the generally higher 
social welfare expenditures in those countries; however, this variable is 
not statistically significant. The dependency ratio variable appears to 
have a highly positive and significant effect on inequality in developed 
countries. 
The evidence in the literature on the effect of trade openness on 
income inequality is inconclusive. Barro (2000) finds a positive relation­
ship between trade openness and income inequality, while Calderon and 
Chong (2001) and Dollar and Kray (2002) do not find any significant 
relationship. Our results provide some evidence of a positive effect of trade 
openness on income inequality, but this effect vanishes in the subsamples. 
Finally, we control for variations in the conceptual measurement of the 
Gini coefficient, and as expected, we find that measured income inequality 
is significantly smaller when net income or consumption are used vis-a-vis 
gross income. 
On Foreign Direct Investment 
Because of globalization and the increasing international mobility of the 
factors of production, especially of capital, there has been a lot of interest 
in the literature studying FDI (foreign direct investment) flows and how 
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corporate income taxes and other direct taxes may affect these flows.50 
Thus, the choice of tax structure and in particular the direct to indirect 
tax ratio can be anticipated to have potentially significant effects on FD1 
flows. That is the question researched in this section. 
In this section, again, our strategy in analyzing the potential role of 
the direct to indirect tax ratio in FD1 flows consists of including the tax 
ratio with a set of other control variables, in a general specification that 
has been commonly used in the empirical literature on the determinants 
ofFDI. 
Because data availability is more of a problem with respect to FDI, 
we are limited to using an annual panel data set for 53 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1984-2005. We use two alternative 
measures of FDI: global net FDI inflows to GDP ratio from UNCTAD,51 
and the ratio of net FDI inflow from the United States to GDP from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As we have done in all the previous 
sections, we employ two alternative definitions of the direct to indirect 
tax ratio, depending on whether property taxes are categorized as direct 
or indirect taxes. In addition, the analysis will be performed for the full 
sample of countries and for the two subsamples of developed and develop­
ing countries. 
The empirical model we estimate is 
FDI, = 3f„p + u,. + e,,; i= 1, . . . , « , / =  1,.  . . ,  T  (2.10) 
where i is an index for country and t an index for year, and FDI is the net 
foreign direct investments inflow (total or from the US) to GDP over time 
and across countries; Xit is the set of observable characteristics that affect 
FDI inflow, including: the direct to indirect tax ratio, GDP per capita, 
average effective tax rate, infrastructure (proxied by the number of tel­
ephone lines), education, and political and institutional variables (democ­
racy, corruption, and bureaucracy). The set of explanatory variables, 
except for the direct to indirect tax ratio, represents a consensus specifica­
tion in the empirical literature on foreign direct investments. Finally, o, 
represents time-invariant individual country effect. 
In terms of estimation issues, the Flausman test for fixed versus random 
effects rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by 
the consistent fixed effects estimator, indicating the need to apply the 
fixed effects procedure. In order to account for individual country effects, 
we include a set of country dummies in our estimation model. Next, we 
test for the presence of a non-linear relationship between the tax mix and 
FDI but fail to detect it. Finally, we detect the existence of panel-specific 
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Table 2.5 Tax ratio and foreign direct investments: 1984-2005 
(dependent variables: total FDI net flow and net flow from 
t h e  U S )  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Total FDI FDI from 
US 
Total FDI FDI from 
US 
Total FDI FDI from 
US 
Tax ratio -0.057* -0.033** -0.157** -0.063** 0.002 -0.014 
(0.034) (0.014) (0.073) (0.027) (0.002) (0.012) 
GDP per -0.010 0.013* -0.015 0.015* 0.003 -0.020** 
cap (0.016) (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
Labor cost 0.002 -0.007 0.004 -0.009* 0.001 -0.001 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
Average -0.845** -0.294** -1.148* -0.441** 0.016 -0.275 
effected tax (0.406) (0.125) (0.600) (0.181) (0.040) (0.193) 
rate (AETR) 
AETR sq 0.780** 0.302** 0.957* 0.406** -0.024 0.269 
(0.374) (0.122) (0.539) (0.172) (0.038) (0.186) 
Telephone 0.165* 0.068** 0.197** 0.072** 0.004 0.079*** 
landlines (0.095) (0.027) (0.090) (0.030) (0.007) (0.021) 
Secondary -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000* -0.001 
school (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
enrollment 
Democracy -0.040 -0.113* -0.292 -0.173 0.012 -0.100 
(0.073) (0.062) (0.353) (0.145) (0.021) (0.067) 
Corruption 0.007 0.008 0.032 0.005 -0.000 0.014 
(0.021) (0.007) (0.031) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) 
Bureaucracy 0.124** -0.032 0.295** -0.075 -0.001 0.019*** 
(0.062) (0.029) (0.121) (0.047) (0.003) (0.006) 
Constant -0.200 0.295*** 0.000 0.000 -0.048** 0.117 
(0.231) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.073) 
Observations 379 374 257 253 122 121 
Number of id 42 42 25 25 17 17 
R-squared 0.30 0.48 0.33 0.57 0.58 0.07 
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors. 
autocorrelation so we use throughout the PCSEs to correct for autocor­
relation (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
Table 2.5 presents the results obtained when property taxes are classi­
fied as direct taxes in the numerator of the tax ratio variable.52 Our results 
show that that the direct to indirect tax ratio, our variable of interest, as 
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expected, affects both total and FDI from the United States inflows nega­
tively with the coefficients being statistically significant for the full sample 
and the developed country subsample. However, the coefficients are statis­
tically insignificant for developing countries. 
For the other control variables, the results reported in Table 2.5 are 
fairly standard in the FDI empirical literature. The coefficient for GDP per 
capita takes a positive sign whenever significant in the case of full sample 
and developed countries, suggesting that high-income countries tend to 
attract more investments from the United States, whereas the results for 
developing countries suggest the opposite, lower-income countries tend to 
attract more foreign direct investments from the United States. Positive 
and statistically significant results hold for telephone lines, suggesting that 
foreign investors are more attracted to a better infrastructure. However, 
the coefficients for the labor cost variable are mostly insignificant, except 
for FDI from the United States for developed countries where cheaper 
labor attracts more FDI. 
For the average effective tax rate (computed from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis data for US firms), we find a statistically significant 
and robust non-linear relationship. Foreign investors are discouraged 
by higher average effective rates but this is so at a decreasing rate. In the 
regressions we also control for the effect of political and institutional vari­
ables (democracy, corruption, and bureaucracy). Corruption, measured by 
an index from 0 to 6, with 6 denoting least corruption, takes the expected 
positive sign, but it is mostly statistically insignificant. Bureaucracy, also 
measured by an index from 0 to 6, with 6 denoting the highest quality, has 
the expected positive sign whenever significant. Finally, we estimate very 
consistent negative and in some cases significant effects for democracy, 
suggesting that less democratic countries may be able to attract more 
foreign direct investment.53 This is in accord with some results in the previ­
ous literature.54 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have examined the evolution and economic conse­
quences over the last three decades of the direct to indirect tax ratio in 
the tax systems of a large number of developed and developing countries. 
Over this time period the average ratio of direct to indirect taxes for a 
sample of 116 countries has been on the increase and this movement has 
been more pronounced for developed countries than for developing coun­
tries. The underlying reasons for these trends have differed between the 
two groups of countries, with increases in Social Security contributions 
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being the main driver in the case of developed countries and a fairly large 
decrease in the relative importance of customs taxes that has been only 
partially offset by an increase in domestic consumption taxes in the case of 
developing countries. 
While the optimal tax literature never provided quick or exact recipes 
to be followed in the design of tax structures, it has been understood 
that optimal tax design requires the use of both direct and indirect taxes 
leaving open what the optimal tax mix should be. The more recent empiri­
cal evidence based on endogenous growth models tells a robust story on 
the negative effects on the rate of economic growth of heavy reliance on 
different forms of direct taxation. But as we saw in several sections of this 
chapter the choice between direct and indirect forms of taxation may not 
be so clear. While lowering the direct to indirect tax ratio, it seems, would 
bring advantages in terms of economic growth and an enhanced competi­
tive stand regarding FDI, it would also dampen the ability to rely on auto­
matic stabilizers for the macroeconomy and possibly reduce the scope or 
ability for income redistribution policies. 
In terms of those potential trade-offs, it is interesting to note that 
developing countries, by choosing on average a much lower direct to 
indirect tax ratio than developed countries, seem to be giving a much 
heavier weight to economic growth and FDI flows than to the potential 
distributional and macroeconomic control issues. But, of course, the 
choice of tax mix by developing countries is also significantly based on 
administration and capacity issues. Our empirical findings provide a 
first-order approximation for quantifying the types of trade-offs policy­
makers would face in making choices on the overall tax mix. From our 
estimates and provided that the tax mix ratio is within some expected 
bounds, a 10 percentage point increase in the direct to indirect tax ratio 
on average would reduce economic growth and FDI inflows by 0.39 per 
cent and 0.57 per cent respectively, but at the same time it would also 
reduce economic volatility by 0.15 per cent and income inequality by 
about 1 percent. However, we need to recall that the equalizing effect 
of higher direct to indirect tax ratios on the income distribution is par­
tially dependent on the size of tax system; the larger the ratio of taxes 
to GDP, the larger the equalizing effect of the tax mix ratio. We find a 
tax to GDP ratio threshold of 0.29 for the tax mix ratio to have equal­
izing effects on income distribution; this pattern seems to fit the conven­
tional wisdom on the low impact of tax systems on income inequality, 
especially in the case of developing countries because of their generally 
smaller tax systems. 
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* Presented at a Conference sponsored by the Savings Banks Foundation of Spain 
FUNCAS, and UNICAJA, Malaga, Spain, 'Tax Systems: Whence and Whither 
(Recent Evolution, Current Problems and Future Challenges)', 9-11 September, 2009. 
We are thankful to Jesus Ruiz-Huerta for helpful comments. 
1. Other definitions of direct and indirect taxes could be used that would likely produce 
similar classification results. For example, Poterba et al. (1986) define direct taxes as 
taxes on individuals, including income taxes and employee contributions for social 
insurance, and indirect taxes are defined as those collected from firms, including sales 
and value-added taxes, employer contributions for social insurance, and various excise 
taxes. For empirical estimation purposes in this chapter, given the data available, we 
will allow for several groupings of direct and indirect taxes. 
2. Essentially Hicks (1939) assumed identical individuals with perfectly inelastic labor 
supply (Atkinson, 1977). 
3. See, for example, the discussion in Lee and Gordon (2005). 
4. However, Watrin and Ullman (2008) using an experimental approach find that partici­
pants are less compliant with consumption taxes than with income taxes. 
5. Trends in Figures 2.1-2.5 are based on five-year moving averages. 
6. See Table 2A.3 in the Appendix at the end of the chapter for an accounting of the 
number of observations for each period and a discussion of the changes in definitions 
and reporting in the GFS data set (Box 2A.1). 
7. The policy thrust has also been the subject of theoretical criticism. For example, Emran 
and Stiglitz (2005) have argued that a revenue-neutral shifting from tariff to VAT is 
welfare worsening because of the existence of a large informal sector in developing 
countries; Munk (2008) has argued along similar lines because the allocation benefits 
from domestic taxes may be outweighed by increasing administrative costs. See also 
Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Moller (2008) on the negative effect on market access 
and questionable welfare effects. 
8. See also Johansson et al. (2008). Part of the reduction in the share of personal income 
taxes can be explained by a change towards flatter personal income tax schedules and a 
reduction in the top statutory income tax rates. 
9. Alternatively, their model can be interpreted as one of tax avoidance with different 
compliance costs. Some other authors have questioned the premise that direct taxes 
may be more difficult to evade than indirect taxes. See, for example, Kesselman (1993). 
10. Without evasion, there is equivalence between a uniform commodity and an income 
tax. However, with tax evasion, that equivalence is gone. Dahlby (2003) argues that 
both forms of consumption taxation, direct consumption tax in the form of expenditure 
tax and indirect consumption tax in the form of a sales tax, are needed because both 
types of taxes are subject to somewhat different forms of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
behavior. 
11. For a dissenting view see Mendoza et al. (1997) who provide evidence in support of 
Harberger's (1964) claim that, although theory may predict that the mix of direct and 
indirect taxes is an important determinant of long-run growth and investment rates, 
in practice plausible changes in tax rates are unlikely to affect growth, even if they can 
alter moderately the investment rate. 
12. Borge and Rattso's (2004) work for Norwegian local governments in 1996 supports the 
Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. 
13. See, for example. Martinez-Vazquez (2008). 
14. Nevertheless, Mino and Nakamoto (2008) warn that in the presence of heterogeneous 
agents with different preferences, the stabilizing power of progressive income taxation 
demonstrated in representative-agent models may not always be effective. 
15. Clustered by country. 
16. See Table 2A.4 in the Appendix for the results obtained using this definition of the 
dependent variable. 
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17. A few other papers have examined the composition of tax structures. Aizenman and 
Jinjarak (2006) evaluate the impact of globalization throughout the 1980s 90s on the 
vector of taxes collected by countries at varying stages of development. At the sub-
national level, Geys and Revelli (2009) investigate the economic and political determi­
nants of the local tax mix in the Flemish region of Belgium. 
18. Hines and Summers (2009) also use the interaction of the natural logarithm (In) of 
income and In population as an additional explanatory variable; all variables are nor­
malized by dividing them by their annual means. 
19. We re-estimate the model using percentage of shadow economy as an alternative vari­
able for agriculture. However, due to the quite small number of observations on this 
variable, the sample size reduces significantly, causing some of the coefficients to lose 
the statistical significance. The simple correlation between agriculture and shadow 
economy is 0.5. 
20. The list of variables and data sources and descriptive statistics are presented in the 
Appendix, Tables 2A.1 and 2A.2, respectively. 
21. The exact replication of methodology and specification of Kenny and Winer (2006) 
but using the direct to indirect tax ratio as the dependent variable and five-year sub-
sample periods rather that annual data produced similar but generally weaker results. 
We would expect that the effect of some of the explanatory variables on individual tax 
categories may be neutralized when the dependent variable is the tax mix ratio. 
22. The intuition behind potential endogeneity in size of government is that more efficient 
tax structures will lead to the growing size of the government sector. To correct for poten­
tial endogeneity in government size, Kenny and Winer use two instrumental variables, 
absolute latitude of the country's largest city and voter turnout. Latitude is used because 
temperate zones have climate that is more agriculturally productive and less severe, ena­
bling countries located in these zones to develop their economies faster (Landes, 1998; La 
Porta et al., 1999). Beck et al. (2004) also apply this same intuition to the case of financial 
development. The North Temperate Zone extends from the Tropic of Cancer (at about 
23.5 degrees north latitude) to the Arctic Circle (at approximately 66.6 degrees north 
latitude). The South Temperate Zone extends from the Tropic of Capricorn (at approxi­
mately 23.5 degrees south latitude,) to the Antarctic (at approximately 66.6 degrees south 
latitude). The intuition behind using voter turnout is from Mueller and Stratmann (2003) 
who find that countries with higher voter turnout rates have more equal income distribu­
tion and larger government size (measured by expenditures and transfers to GDP). 
23. Note that for the voter turnout instrument we had to adapt the variable to our annual 
observations by interpolating the annual data between the election dates. 
24. We also test for but find no heteroskedasticity in our model. 
25. See Beck and Katz (1995) who show that the ordinary least squares (OLS) with the 
PCSE' is the most proper approach for data sets with relatively many cross-sectional 
units (A) and relatively short time period (70- This approach is compatible with unbal­
anced panel estimation. The panel corrected standard errors are robust in the style of 
Huber-White standard errors. However, using the Huber-White rather than PCSE 
formula to calculate standard errors would be wrong because it ignores the fact that we 
assume there is a common variance structure within a cross-section unit and that the 
correlation across units follows a very specific pattern - equal covariance between any 
two units for any particular time. 
26. The Hausman (1978) test for fixed/random effects fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the 
ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator, allowing us to apply the fixed 
effects procedure. However, since the Hausman test may be misleading due to the pres­
ence of autocorrelation, we include a set of individual country dummies in our regres­
sion model to control for individual unobservable fixed effects. 
27. Property taxes are included in the direct taxes. Results obtained using the alternative 
definition of tax ratio that includes property taxes in indirect taxes are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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28. We re-estimate the model by using the alternative definition of tax ratio where property 
taxes are included in indirect taxes but obtain very similar results. 
29. We re-estimated the model by using political rights and civil liberties separately, rather 
than combined in the democracy index and find no significant change in the results. 
30. This is in line with some of the previous literature claiming that political factors are not 
important in determining the actual shape of tax mix (Volkerink and de Haan, 1999; 
Geys and Revelli, 2009). 
31. However, Messere (1993) finds no evidence that increasing economic integration would 
greatly affect the tax mix in OECD countries. 
32. See Kau and Rubin (1981) for an elaboration on the argument that urbanization posi­
tively affects taxes on goods and services because of the potential less monitoring costs 
on tax compliance in urban areas. 
33. Since the pioneering contributions by Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Barro (1990), Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), King and Rebelo (1990), and Lucas (1990), empirical 
research on economic growth has been extended in various fiscal dimensions, including 
public expenditure and taxation (Jones et al., 1993; Mendoza et al., 1997; Kim, 1998; 
Dahlby, 2003; and Lee and Gordon, 2005). 
34. In turn, Lee and Gordon's (2005) estimating equation, except for the tax variables, is 
based on the specification used in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (1992). 
35. The smaller the size of country z, the relatively shorter the distance between its largest 
city and largest cities in neighboring countries, implying relatively stronger effect 
of their tax ratios on the tax ratio in country j. The source for the distance measure 
between two countries is CEPII (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales, http://www.cepii.fr/). Geodesic distances are calculated following the 
great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/ 
agglomerations in terms of population. 
36. We used a Hausman test to check for the appropriateness of fixed effects estimation 
approach. 
37. Practically identical results are obtained when property taxes are included as indirect 
taxes; these results are available from the authors. 
38. For example, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) argue that corruption facilitates economic 
growth because it helps government officials become more efficient in approving the 
project process. On the other hand, Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) claim 
that corruption increases uncertainty in decision-making and in the costs of conducting 
business, and, therefore, that it reduces economic growth. 
39. To investigate the presence of multicollinearity, we calculate the tolerance and variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for each explanatory variable and find that almost all variables 
have tolerance higher than 0.4 and a low VIF value, suggesting a low degree of multi­
collinearity, if any. We also perform a sample estimation of the correlations between 
the independent variables. Only three correlation coefficients satisfy the 'conservative' 
requirement of 0.5 or larger, involving the corporate tax rate. When the corporate 
tax rate is excluded from the regression, the R-squared for the subsample of develop­
ing countries drops substantially (from 0.87 to 0.66), but the coefficients for school 
enrollment, openness, and inflation now become statistically significant. In the case of 
developed countries, the exclusion of the corporate rate does not cause any significant 
changes. 
40. The literature on this issue is large, going back to Musgrave and Miller (1948), Brown 
(1955), Musgrave (1959), and Pearse (1962). 
41. Money is the sum of currency outside banks and demand deposits other than those of 
central government. This series, frequently referred to as Ml is a narrower definition of 
money than M2. Data are in current local currency. For more information, see Table s; 
WDI 4.15 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FM.LBL.BMNY.CN). 
42. Since we are allowed to use random effects rather than fixed effects, we further con­
sider whether there are any unobserved effects at all. If this were the case, we could use 
pooled OLS, which would offer two important advantages: it would provide a gain in 
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efficiency because we would not have to allow for within-group correlations, and we 
could use its finite sample properties rather than relying on asymptotic properties of 
random effects. However, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null 
hypothesis that OLS is consistent, so we stay with the random effects procedure. 
43. Even though the squared terms are frequently not individually statistically significant, 
the level and the squared term are often jointly significant at the 10 per cent level. 
44. However, not including the squared term may bias the estimates of the level term 
upwards. The correlation within each pair (dependent variable versus included variable, 
dependent variable versus omitted variable, and omitted variable versus included vari­
able) is positive, implying that the estimate is upwardly biased. 
45. The evidence on redistributive effects of taxes is especially weak for developing coun­
tries (Bird and Zolt, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; and Harberger, 2008). 
46. To control for the fact that income distributions across countries are based on different 
measurements of income, including gross income, net income, and consumption, we 
include in our empirical model a set of dummies for net income and consumption defini­
tions, and use gross income as the base category. 
47. The over-identification test has a P-value of 0.9, suggesting that we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instrumental variable for the tax ratio is exogenous. 
48. Sala-i-Martin (1997) finds that larger government size, measured by social transfers, 
reduces income inequality, while Landau (1985), Peden and Bradley (1989), Folster and 
Herekson (2001) find that resources are allocated less efficiently within larger govern­
ments, with government size having no or a negative effect on income inequality. 
49. As education expands, income distribution may become more unequal, which is par­
ticularly important in countries with very low levels of education. However, as more 
people receive education, the return to education will generally decline, reducing 
income inequality (Schultz, 1960; Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Knight and Sabot, 1983; 
and Gregorio and Lee, 2002). 
50. See, for example, Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2002), Buttner (2002), De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2003,2005), Benassy-Quere et al. (2005, 2007), Razin and Sadka (2006). 
51. According to the UNCTAD definition, FDI flows consist of the net sales of shares 
and loans (including non-cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufactur­
ing rights, etc.) to the parent company plus the parent firm's share of the affiliate's 
reinvested earnings plus total net intra-company loans (short and long term) provided 
by the parent company. For branches, FDI flows consist of the increase in reinvested 
earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI 
flows with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components 
in the above definition is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the remaining 
components. 
52. The corresponding results with the alternative definition of the tax ratio are fairly 
similar and therefore not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
53. The democracy variable measures the existence of civil rights and liberties and is calcu­
lated as (14 - civil liberties - political rights)/12, where both 'civil liberties' and 'political 
rights' are scaled from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). 
54. See Adam and Filippaios (2007) for a review of the literature on this issue. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2 A. 1 Variables description and sources 


















FDI from US 
to GDP (net) 
Share of agriculture in GDP 
Average effective tax rate 
= foreign income taxes/ 
(foreign income tax + net 
incomes) of all affiliates for 
US firms operating abroad 
in each country 
Bureaucratic quality index, 
ranging from 0-6, with 6 
denoting the highest quality 
(14—political rights-civil 
liberties )/l 2 
Scale from 1 (most free) 
to 7 (least free) 
Scale from 1 (most free) 
to 7 (least free) 
Top marginal statutory 
Corporate income tax rate 
in the initial year of the 
corresponding period 
Corruption index, ranging 
from 0-6, with 6 denoting 
least corruptive 
Per capital crude petroleum 
production (in thousands 
of metric tons) 
Age dependency 
ratio (dependents to 
working-age population) 
Average years of 
schooling in the adult 
population 25+ years old 
State and local expenditure 
to total (central, state, local) 
expenditure 
Foreign direct investment 




Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 2009 




Office of Tax Policy 
Research (OTPR) 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 2008 




Barro and Lee (2000) 
IMF GFS: Authors' 
calculations 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) 
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Table 2 A. 1 (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
Total FDI to Total foreign direct invest­ UNCTAD 
GDP (net) ment flows divided by GDP 
Federal = 1 if country has formal Handbook of Federal 
federal structure Countries, 2005 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in current World Development 
(current prices) local prices Indicators (WDI) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2000 World Development 
(real) US$ Indicators (WDI) 
GDP per capita Real per capita GDP World Development 
growth rate growth rate Indicators (WDI) 
Gini Gini coefficient UNU-WIDER World 
Income Inequality 
Database, May 2008 
Globalization KOF Index of ETH Zurich KOF 
Globalization Konjunkturforschungsstelle 
Inflation, Inflation, consumer World Development 
consumer prices prices (annual %) Indicators (WDI) 
Labor cost Wages of employees working Bureau of Economic 
in US companies' foreign Analysis (BEA) 
affiliates (000 $US/year) 
Labor force Labor force participation World Development 
participation rate, total (share of total Indicators (WDI) 
population ages 15-64) 
Labor force Labor force participation World Development 
participation rate, female (share of female Indicators (WDI) 
female population ages 15-64) 
Latitude The absolute value of La Porta et al. (1999) 
the latitude of the 
country, scaled to take 
values between 0 and 1 
Legal origin The legal origin of La Porta et al. (1999) 
the Company Law or 
Commercial Code of each 
country: English, French, or 
German Commercial Code 
M1 growth rate The annual growth of the World Development 
sum of currency outside Indicators (WDI) 
banks and demand deposits 
other than those of central 
government. 
Population Population size World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
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Table 2 A. 1 (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
Population Population growth rate World Development 
growth rate Indicators (WDI) 
Private credit Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP 
Beck et al. (2000/2008) 
School enrollment Primary enrollment rate (%) UNESCO Institute of 
primary (gross) Statistics 
School enrollment Secondary enrollment UNESCo Institute of 
secondary rate (%) (gross) Statistics 
Socialist Countries having either Gastil (various years); 
a socialist economic system Kornai (1992) 
or a mixed socialist economic 
system and a socialist or 
communist political 
Tax ratio 1 Direct (income tax, IMF GFS: Authors' 
payroll tax, Social Security calculations 
contributions, property tax) 
to Indirect (taxes on goods 
and services, taxes on int'l 
trade, other taxes) tax ratio 
Tax ratio 2 Direct (income tax, IMF GFS: Authors' 
payroll tax, Social Security calculations 
contributions) to indirect 
(taxes on goods and services, 
taxes on int'l trade, other 
taxes, property tax) tax ratio 
Telephone Telephone landlines World Development 
landlines (per 1000 people) Indicators (WDI) 
Total tax to Share of total (tax and IMF GFS, WDI: Authors' 
GDP non-tax) revenue in GDP 
in current prices 
calculations 
Trade openness (Imports + exports)/GDP World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Urbanization Urban population World Development 
(share of total) Indicators (WDI) 
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Table 2A.2 Variables descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Agriculture to GDP 3205 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.94 
Average effective tax rate 1152 0.33 0.20 -0.28 0.98 
Bureaucracy index 1114 2.84 1.08 0.00 4.00 
Corporate tax rate (%) 453 35.14 11.79 0.00 60.00 
(subsample initial year) 
Corporate tax rate IV 454 35.36 3.87 25.62 43.54 
(subsample initial year) 
Corruption index 1912 3.37 1.45 0.00 6.00 
Crude petrol per capita 1798 2.61 10.38 0.00 196.24 
(000 of metric tons) 
Democracy index 3394 0.60 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Political rights 3396 3.35 2.16 1.00 7.00 
Civil liberties 3394 3.14 1.86 1.00 7.00 
Dependency ratio 3831 0.68 0.19 0.31 1.17 
EU15 3944 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Expenditure decentralization 1487 25.22 17.31 0.56 87.00 
Federal 3944 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
GDP (real) per capita ($) 3501 6995.34 8770.67 56.45 51 673.98 
GDP (real) per capita 3295 1.86 3.70 -9.54 9.26 
growth rate (%) 
Gini coefficient (%) 1302 35.85 10.22 16.60 73.90 
Net income Gini concept 1302 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Gross income Gini concept 1302 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Consumption Gini concept 1302 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Globalization 3429 0.52 0.18 0.09 0.93 
Inflation, consumer prices (%) 3192 10.65 13.45 -21.68 99.88 
Labor cost (000 $US) 1154 25.80 17.80 2.59 89.96 
Labor force participation 2938 0.69 0.09 0.46 0.93 
Latitude 3944 0.32 0.20 0.01 0.72 
Legal origin English 3944 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Legal origin French 3944 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Legal origin German 3944 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
M1 growth rate 2964 0.29 1.75 -0.42 67.25 
Net FDI from the US 1114 0.11 0.29 -0.01 2.92 
to GDP 
Net FDI to GDP 1166 0.04 0.22 -0.16 4.97 
Openness 2974 0.77 0.54 0.07 4.32 
Population 3933 26 900 000 84 500 000 40 130 1 100 000 000 
Population Growth Rate 3830 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
Private credit to GDP 3040 0.45 0.38 0.01 3.45 
School enrollment primary 1107 85.55 18.12 9.48 104.57 
School enrollment secondary 639 84.92 24.86 19.00 161.66 
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Table 2A.2 (continued) 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Socialist 3944 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Tax ratio 1 3944 3.32 1.97 0.02 4.87 
Tax ratio 1 (Poterba et al., 1773 0.02 0.10 -0.25 0.44 
1986) 
Tax ratio 1 IV 3944 1.52 0.45 0.22 5.17 
Tax ratio 2 3944 3.21 2.03 0.00 4.50 
Tax ratio 2 (Poterba et al., 1773 -0.03 0.06 -0.26 0.39 
1986) 
Tax Ratio 2 IV 3944 1.28 0.37 0.20 3.10 
Telephone landlines 1166 2.81 2.15 0.02 7.97 
(per 000 people) 
Total revenue to GDP 1715 0.28 0.13 0.03 0.64 
Urbanization 3944 0.54 0.24 0.03 1.00 
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BOX 2A.1 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PER YEAR 
FOR WHICH THE GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE DATA IS AVAILABLE 
IN THE SAMPLE: ISSUES WITH 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDS' 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS 
DATA 
Data on taxes are downloaded from the International Monetary 
Fund's (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Database, 
which provides data with consistent definitions across countries 
and years. However, a change in methodology from GFS1986 to 
GFS2001 in 2001, with the data from 1990 onward being reclas­
sified from the old to the new methodology, has made historical 
data (1972-89) not comparable with new data (1990 onwards). 
Another issue is that coverage for particular regions and individual 
years may be limited. Given that data collection is through a ques­
tionnaire filled out each year by local ministries in member coun­
tries, data availability in the GFS Database primarily depends on 
filer responsiveness. Table 2A.3 documents the data availability 
for each year in the sample. 
The classifications of revenue are substantially different in 
the two manuals. Revenue in the 1986 GFS Manual is classi­
fied as tax, non-tax, or capital revenue. Grants form a separate, 
non-revenue category of receipts. In the revised GFS Manual, 
revenue is subdivided into taxes, social insurance contributions, 
grants, and other revenue. In more detail: taxes exclude Social 
Security contributions in the revised GFS Manual, but include 
them in the 1986 GFS Manual; social insurance contributions in 
the revised GFS Manual include Social Security contributions, 
which are classified as taxes in the 1986 GFS Manual, and con­
tributions to social insurance schemes operated for the benefit of 
government employees, which are classified as non-tax revenue 
in the 1986 GFS Manual. 
Source: 2001 GFS Manual: p. 158. 
Table 2 A.3 Number of countries in the sample 
Year Full Developed Developing Countries in Year Full Developed Developing Countries in 
Sample Countries Countries Transition Sample Countries Countries Transition 
1972 52 21 31 0 1989 77 26 51 0 
1973 67 25 42 0 1990 4 0 4 0 
1974 69 26 43 0 1991 4 0 4 0 
1975 74 26 48 0 1992 4 0 4 0 
1976 78 26 52 0 1993 4 0 4 0 
1977 76 26 50 0 1994 5 0 4 0 
1978 77 26 51 0 1995 16 9 6 0 
1979 77 25 52 0 1996 17 9 7 0 
1980 81 27 54 0 1997 18 10 7 0 
1981 78 27 51 0 1998 26 17 8 0 
1982 76 27 49 0 1999 32 20 11 0 
1983 78 27 51 0 2000 41 26 12 3 
1984 80 27 53 0 2001 47 28 15 4 
1985 83 27 56 0 2002 59 29 24 6 
1986 83 27 56 0 2003 65 28 28 9 
1987 77 27 50 0 2004 62 27 26 9 
1988 80 27 53 0 2005 50 21 21 8 
Source: Government Finance Statistics Manual2001 (GFSM2001), IMF Statistics Department, 2001. 
Table 2 A.4 Determinants of tax mix: 1972-2005, fixed effects, annual data (dependent variable: tax ratio") 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Developed Developing Full Developed Developing 
Demand factors 
Scale effect 
Revenue to GDP 0.3410*** 0.3802*** 0.1240** 0.2803*** 0.4120*** 0.0162 
(0.0427) (0.0365) (0.0570) (0.0368) (0.0422) (0.0411) 
Log(population) -0.0379 -0.9733 3.5780*** -0.1186 -0.1269 1.6323* 
(0.7455) (1.3251) (1.3630) (0.6610) (0.8749) (0.8352) 
Federal 0.3055 0.1462 -0.9824*** -0.0423 . 0.2423*** 0.3030*** 
(0.8275) (0.1016) (0.3706) (0.1772) (0.0889) (0.0778) 
Decentralization 0.0002 -0.0009* 0.0010** -0.0000 -0.0007** 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Political preferences 
Democracy 0.0200 -0.0302 0.0558*** -0.0048 -0.0239 0.0082 
(0.0162) (0.0410) (0.0171) (0.0113) (0.0293) (0.0085) 
Socialist -0.0057 0.0000 0.0100 -0.0034 0.0000 0.0148 
(0.0214) (0.0000) (0.0280) (0.0203) (0.0000) (0.0253) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.0338 -0.3018 0.0758 -0.0666 -0.0824 0.0706 
(0.1281) (0.3292) (0.1431) (0.1098) (0.1681) (0.1057) 
Supply factors 
Tax base effect 
Crude petrol -0.0014 -0.0014** 0.0022 
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0050) 
Table 2 A.4 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Developed Developing Full Developed Developing 
Supply factors 
Tax base effect 
LFP 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0014** 0.0011 0.0012* 
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
Openness 0.0380*** -0.0407** 0.0397*** 0.0187** -0.0261*** 0.0275*** 
(0.0099) (0.0207) (0.0101) (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0086) 
Agriculture 0.1667 -0.7812*** -0.0319 0.0272 -0.1493 -0.0499 
(0.1066) (0.2980) (0.1102) (0.0670) (0.1382) (0.0561) 
Globalization -0.145*** 0.0384 -0.1850*** -0.0730** 0.0941 -0.1726*** 
(0.0487) (0.1019) (0.0575) (0.0349) (0.0574) (0.0393) 
Administration costs 
Urbanization -0.515*** -0.3224 -0.4416*** -0.434*** -0.5364*** -0.3398*** 
(0.1262) (0.2161) (0.1174) (0.1057) (0.1284) (0.0950) 
Constant 0.0000 1.4358 -2.7267** 0.4681 0.3053 -1.9395* 
(0.0000) (1.5138) (1.1227) (0.8042) (0.9675) (0.9989) 
Observations 437 227 210 635 328 307 
Number of id 41 17 24 63 24 39 
R-squared 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.93 0.90 
Notes: 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a. Dependent variable calculated as (x - 9)/(l + 6) where t is the direct tax rate and 0 the indirect tax rate, and these tax rates computed, 
respectively, as total direct and direct taxes divided by nominal GDP, as in Poterba et al. (1986). 
Source: Authors. 
